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Abstract
We present a simple model of status-seeking over multiple socioeco-
nomic domains by introducing the concept of conspicuous health as
an argument in the utility function, in addition to the well-established
conspicuous consumption term. We explore the implications of such a
utility function for optimal non-linear taxation, where an increase in
concerns for conspicuous health has an opposite eect on the marginal
tax rate, compared to an increase in concerns for conspicuous con-
sumption. Using life satisfaction panel data from Australia, along
with an improved measure of exogenous reference groups (that ac-
counts for the `time era' of respondents), we nd empirical evidence
of a comparison health eect.
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1 Introduction
Often when individuals are asked about their general health level at any given
point in time, the typical response is something along the lines: `It could be
better', or, `It could be worse'. Although such a response may be regarded as
everyday convention, it nevertheless implies some notion of a health compar-
ison to a reference level (for example, to oneself at an earlier point in time,
or to other individuals familiar to the respondent). Moreover, people have
always been known to compare their physical state or appearance such as
beauty, height and weight to others they might know, hear about, or view
on television, for example.1 Thereby, individuals are bound to experience a
positive shock (presumably of relief or, in some cases, pride and self-esteem)
from knowing that they are better looking, taller, tter or healthier than
relevant others in society.
Within the economics literature, the role of relative concerns, or inter-
dependent preferences, in explaining individual choice behaviour has been
studied quite extensively in recent times (see Clark et al. 2008). The main
focus has been on status eects arising from relative consumption (or in-
come), usually dened as the ratio of own consumption to reference group
or comparison consumption. The large number of studies using relative con-
sumption as an argument in the utility function has lead researchers to view
consumption as the premier signal of social status that individuals demand.
As a result, little is currently known about the empirical importance and
public policy implications of other social comparisons, i.e. the pursuit of
status in other or multiple socioeconomic domains (see Veblen 1899; Layard
1980).2
In this paper we present a simple theoretical model of status-seeking
over multiple socioeconomic domains by introducing the concept of conspic-
uous health as an argument in the utility function, in addition to the well-
1See Eckel and Petrie (2011) and Hamermesh (2011) for an overview of the importance
of physical appearance on socioeconomic outcomes within society.
2A notable exception has been the leisure domain, rst highlighted by Veblen (1899),
and empirically examined by a number of recent studies, including Pingle and Mitchell
(2002), Alpizar et al. (2005), Solnick and Hemenway (2005), Carlsson et al. (2007), and
Frijters and Leigh (2009). Most of the studies nd relative leisure to be of importance
for individual well-being and choice behaviour, however less positional than income or
consumption. Moreover, Layard (1980) makes note of other non-material domains where
relative concerns are also of importance such as eort, education, and sporting ability, i.e.
the presence of simultaneous status races.
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established conspicuous consumption term. We hypothesise utility to be
increasing in own health and decreasing in comparison health. Individuals
are assumed to experience a negative utility shock as others in their social
reference group become healthier; for instance, as relevant others increase
health inputs such as physical exercise, or reduce their alcohol and cigarette
consumption. Thus, peer health is seen by agents as the baseline level of
health that is expected of them in society (a health norm).3 Individuals then
envy and strive towards the health of their peers upon realising that their
own health levels can be improved (an upward revision in societal norms), or
otherwise feel a sense of personal relief as the health of the reference group
deteriorates (due to reduced social standards and expectations). Analogous
to the literature on relative income or conspicuous consumption (Easterlin
1995; McBride 2001), this implies that an individual's relative health con-
fers social status, where the status return from increased health may come
from both a direct warm-glow of perceiving oneself to be more successful in
a domain (a direct status eect), as well as from indirect increases in other
nal goods that come with higher status. These indirect advantages include
superior mating partners, a better occupation or job title, enhanced social
networks and social respect.4
We explore the implications of a utility function that includes a role for
relative health concerns in terms of equilibrium labour choices and optimal
income taxation, where we nd an increase in concerns for conspicuous health
to reduce the rationale for higher marginal taxation.5
The present paper is motivated by and adds to two main streams of lit-
erature; namely, the recent literature on status eects and social norms in
health, and the rather scarce literature on multiple or simultaneous status
races. Our focus on conspicuous health is partly motivated by a few recent
3Based on concepts from psychology and sociology, we refer to a `norm' as the com-
parison point or social standard towards which an individual aspires and is expected to
achieve. This is the same denition used and implied by other earlier studies on compar-
ison eects. See, for example, Easterlin (1995), McBride (2001), Clark (2003), Eggers et
al. (2006), and Graham and Felton (2007).
4For more detailed discussions about the economic and social value of status, and its
importance for market behaviour; see, for example, Ball and Eckel (1998), Becker and
Murphy (2000), Ball et al. (2001), and Johansson-Stenman and Martinsson (2006).
5Several theoretical studies have explored the optimal tax implications of conspicuous
consumption; e.g., Boskin and Sheshinski (1978), Layard (1980), Oswald (1983), Frank
(1985), Ireland (1998), Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000), Hopkins and Kornienko (2004), Abel
(2005), Wedner and Goulder (2008), and Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2008).
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studies that relate individual utility to relative physical appearance and t-
ness. For example, using a similar framework to Oswald and Powdthavee
(2007), Blanchower et al. (2009) consider utility to be relative in people's
body weight, or obesity, as measured by the body mass index (BMI). The
authors nd some empirical support for a relative obesity eect in Germany.
Clark and Etile (2011) test for social interactions in BMI between spouses,
and nd the eect of own BMI on individual well-being to depend on partner
BMI, suggesting the presence of social contagion eects in physical weight.
Similarly, using survey panel data from the United States and Russia, Gra-
ham and Felton (2007) nd individuals who depart from the BMI of their
local peers to experience signicant losses in reported well-being.
In another study, Carrell et al. (2011) use a novel data set consisting
of interactions between randomly assigned college students from the US Air
Force Academy to study the eect of peer tness on (own) individual tness.
The authors nd that subjects do attempt to mimic the tness levels of their
peers, with the probability of failing a basic tness test increasing by threefold
when around fty per cent of one's friends become out-of-shape. While the
study does not directly model a utility function with a relative tness term,
it does appeal to such a motivation by arguing that an individual's desire
to become t depends on the tness of his or her peers. The motivation is
subtly dierent from ours in that the authors implicitly presume the strength
of concern for tness itself to increase if one's peers become tter, which is
more of an endogenous identity eect rather than a relativity eect.
At the same time, only a handful of studies have explicitly considered util-
ity functions with multiple status eects. For example, Frijters and Leigh
(2009) study a society where social competition over visible consumption
and leisure is present. The importance of conspicuous leisure is assumed
to decrease in the resident turnover rate of a given neighbourhood, thus
leading the `stayers' to substitute toward signalling their relative consump-
tion. Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman (2012) provide a theoretical study
on optimal income taxation when the importance of relative consumption
depends on leisure, where the authors interpret Veblen's (1899) arguments
on leisure to imply that conspicuous consumption becomes more visible and
thus more salient for relative utility when leisure increases. The authors
base their analysis on the Stern (1982) and Stiglitz (1982) `two-type' opti-
mal income taxation model, where informational asymmetries exist between
the social planner and private sector households. Broadly similar to our
ndings, Aronsson and Johansson-Stenman nd an increase in concerns for
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relative consumption to have a positive eect on marginal income tax rates,
and better positionality in the relative leisure domain to entail the opposite
eect (for particular individual-ability types). The main dierence within our
framework is that we allow for two relative goods (consumption and health)
rather than one good to be endogenous.
In addition to deriving the theoretical implications of conspicuous health,
we are also interested in the empirical relationship between individual well-
being and peer health. While some of the above studies uncover the presence
of a status or envy channel in personal health, there also exists recent ev-
idence of empathy in health comparisons (a positive relation between own
well-being and better peer health). As an example, using survey data from
Latin America, Graham et al. (2011) nd the direction of estimated com-
parison eects in the health domain to oppose the commonly found negative
well-being impacts from peer income. Similar results suggesting more al-
truistic preferences with respect to peer health in social networks are also
presented by De Wan and Christakis (2009).
A key argument in support of these ndings is that important aspects
of people's health states (such as pain, anxiety, and mobility problems) are
unlikely to be a strong source of self-esteem and social status for those indi-
viduals without such health issues.6 While it is also accepted that changes
in some health conditions are much less conspicuous and harder to observe
(than, say, the consumption of material goods such as automobiles); this
does not however rule out selected aspects of personal health from being per-
ceived as `status worthy', especially given the fact that healthier individuals
are found to be more successful in labour and marriage markets (Becker et
al. 1977; Smith 1999; Wu 2003; Garcia-Gomez 2011). Since we are not quite
sure about the exact elements of the latter set of positional health character-
istics, and at the same time cannot draw out such information from widely
used measures of personal health, we can simply perform an empirical ex-
ercise to nd out the direction and sign attached to some notion of social
health norms and standards. This allows us to shed light on which of the
two alternative psychological channels (envy or empathy) is more dominant
in health comparisons.
We proxy for relative health norms (peer health) using a calculated aver-
6See Graham et al. (2011) and Lora (2012) for recent evidence about the eects of
dierent individual health conditions on self-reported measures of happiness and health
satisfaction.
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age of self-assessed health ratings for persons near the survey respondent in a
number of demographic and socioeconomic variables, as well as the person's
time of response (as measured by survey wave). We term the latter reference
group or cohort constraint as the `time era of respondents' and examine the
impact it has on comparison eect estimates.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 presents the
theoretical model, where we study optimal tax policy responses when agents
engage in multiple status-races in society. Section 3 provides a short empirical
application, where we estimate the importance of relative concerns about
private health and consumption using household survey data from Australia.
Section 4 concludes.
2 Model
We consider a society with n individuals, two private goods, and a pure
public good. The representative individual has preferences over private con-
sumption k, private health h, and a public good G; which includes public
health goods. In addition, individuals care about their social status across
multiple domains, comparing themselves to an exogenous level of consump-
tion and health denoted by ek and eh, respectively. Utility is assumed to take
the quasi-linear form
u = a ln k + b ln

k=ek+ c lnh+ d ln h=eh+ e ln(1  lw   lh) +G (1)
where k=ek and h=eh denote the relative (conspicuous) levels of consumption
and health, respectively. The utility weights a and c measure the direct
eects from private consumption and private health. On the other hand,
b and d signify the status eects from consumption and health, where the
`status return' from increased health may come in the form of superior mating
partners, a better occupation or job title, enhanced social networks and social
respect. The relative magnitudes of b and d can alternatively be viewed as
representing the relative intensity of each status race; where, for example,
b=d = 1 implies equal intensity. As mentioned in the introduction, we can
also interpret the status races in consumption and health as the result of
private utility depending on individual expectations which are determined
by social comparisons.7
7For instance, we can rewrite the utility function in equation (1) as u = a ln k +
b ln [k=E(k)]+c lnh+d ln [h=E(h)]+e ln(1 lw lh)+G, where E(:) denotes the individual's
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Private consumption is dened as k = !(1 )lw, where lw 2 [0; 1] denotes
labour work hours; ! is the wage rate of labour (assumed to be homogenous
across individuals); and  is the marginal tax rate on income. An individual's
private health level is given by h = h0 +  lh, where h0 denotes the initial
(genetic) health endowment; lh 2 [0; 1] is the amount of hours spent on health
enhancing activities such as physical exercise; and  captures the return to
private health from each hour allocated to such activity. Finally, the leisure
term 1 lw lh decreases in the number of work and health production hours.
Individuals maximise utility function (1) by choosing lw and lh, resulting
in the following rst-order conditions
a+ b
lw
=
e
1  lw   lh (2)
(c+ d) 
h0 +  lh
=
e
1  lw   lh (3)
Solving equations (2) and (3) simultaneously for an interior solution, we
arrive at the chosen number of work and health production hours
lw =
(a+ b)( + h0)
(a+ b+ c+ d+ e) 
(4)
lh =
(c+ d)   (a+ b+ e)h0
(a+ b+ c+ d+ e) 
(5)
From the above, we can infer that an interior solution requires (c+d) >
(a+ b+e)h0; for otherwise the exogenous health level is so high that individ-
uals no longer have an incentive to invest positive time amounts into their
health.
2.0.1 Comparative Statics
From the point of view of the individual, the most interesting aspects of this
solution are the comparative statics. We present some of these below:
dlw
db
=
(c+ d+ e)( + h0)
 (a+ b+ c+ d+ e)2
> 0 (6)
expectation of a variable; capturing an internal comparison norm. If we then additionally
assume expectations to be determined by the average in a group (or the whole population);
we have E(k) = ek and E(h) = eh, which leads to the main model presented above.
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dlw
dd
=
 (a+ b)( + h0)
 (a+ b+ c+ d+ e)2
< 0 (7)
dlh
dd
=
(a+ b+ e)( + h0)
 (a+ b+ c+ d+ e)2
> 0 (8)
dlh
db
=
 (c+ d)( + h0)
 (a+ b+ c+ d+ e)2
< 0 (9)
The result in (6) gives the prediction that hours spent on labour produc-
tion will increase as the importance of conspicuous consumption increases;
that is, as the status race in consumption intensies. On the other hand, as
expected, work hours decrease in the concern for conspicuous health (equa-
tion 7). Result (8) leads to the prediction that time spent on health improving
activities, such as going to the gym, increases as the importance of conspic-
uous health rises. And, nally, result (9) states that as the status race in
consumption intensies, people spend less time maintaining and showing o
their health.
2.1 Optimal Taxation and Multiple Status Eects
Suppose the social planner's objective is to maximise the following utilitarian
social welfare function
W (u1; :::; un) =
nX
i=1
ui  nu (10)
where ui denotes the utility of individual household i 2 f1; ::; ng. The last
part of the expression results from the initial assumption of preference and
wage homogeneity among individuals. The social planner knows that each
member of society faces the same utility function, and hence that it is im-
possible for the representative individual to improve her relative position in
a status race. That is, the representative individual enjoys average consump-
tion, k = ek = k, and average health, h = eh = h, (and status) in equilibrium.
Since both k=ek and h=eh are equal to 1, the social planner maximises a re-
duced version of utility function (1),
u = a ln k + c lnh+ e ln(1  lw   lh) +G (11)
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where the relative consumption and relative health terms disappear due to
the logarithm of 1 being zero. The planner maximises (11) subject to the
balanced budget constraint
!lw = G (12)
as well as the private sector solutions, (4) and (5), for the amount of work
and health enhancing hours. The solution for the optimal tax rate,  , is
then obtained by substituting the above constraints into (11), and solving
the rst-order condition for
  =
ah0! + b(h0 +  )!   a (a+ b+ c+ d+ e  !)
(a+ b)(h0 +  )!
(13)
2.1.1 Comparative Statics
The main question for the social planner is: What happens to   as concerns
for relative consumption and relative health (parameters b and d) increase in
society? The answer is given by the comparative statics:
d 
db
=
a (c+ d+ e)
(a+ b)2( + h0)!
> 0 (14)
d 
dd
=
 a 
(a+ b)( + h0)!
< 0 (15)
where a higher marginal tax rate on labour income prevails as the status
race in consumption intensies (equation 14), a nding that is consistent with
existing theoretical literature on optimal nonlinear taxation.8 The intuition is
that a greater degree of concern for relative consumption (higher b) increases
the amount of eort individuals allocate to earning more income, which in
turn increases the benets of higher taxation for the provision of the public
good, G. The greater amount of own consumption relative to leisure increases
the negative externality on others (as their social rank declines), giving the
social planner an added incentive to promote leisure by increasing income
taxation (see e.g., Frank 1985).
On the other hand, the novel result in (15) suggests that increased com-
petition and envy in the health domain leads to a lower optimal marginal
tax rate in society. This is due to individual households substituting work
8See studies cited in footnote 5.
8
hours (lw) for health production hours (lh) which reduces the marginal ben-
ets of taxation to the social planner. Since we can interpret G to include
public health expenditures, the result also states that increased concerns for
conspicuous health reduce the importance of public health goods.
The model thus predicts that positional concerns need not necessarily
lead to higher optimal taxes. It does not even have to be true that an overall
increase in relative concerns (b+d) increases taxation: in the knife-edge case,
when (a+ b) = (c+d+e), the two marginal tax rates are equal in magnitude
and an equal increase in parameters b and d would cancel out, maintaining
the equality above.
It should be noted that the presented model is very stylised and involves a
particularly convenient functional form of individual utility in order to reach
unequivocal solutions. That is, labour supply and health related time are
inelastic (both do not depend on the wage). Furthermore, the income tax
rate has no eect on either optimal time variable. This is a consequence of
using a log-utility function, and excluding any source of non-labor income
in the budget constraint. It is thus useful to briey consider how deviations
from some of these assumptions are likely to aect the derived results.
One possible extension is to consider individual agents to have non-labour
income which is not as visible and hence taxable as formal labour income.
This would imply private consumption to be k = !(1  )lw+Y , where Y is
non-labour income that is taken to be heterogeneous over individuals. This
changes the potential trade-os which agents face since work hours are then
no longer independent of marginal tax rates: individuals with higher levels of
non-labour income will be more responsive to marginal taxation than other
individuals with lower non-labour incomes.9
The net impact is to lower the optimal marginal tax rate since there
now exists a work disincentive eect of marginal taxation (which is absent
from the original model). The comparative statics on the optimal marginal
tax rate then become further complicated by the fact that the status races
in consumption (k=ek) and health (h=eh) no longer drop out from the social
planner's problem since the average of the sum of individual utilities will
not equal the utility of the average or representative individual, and hence
will change with marginal taxation. The latter scal instrument will then
have an additional redistributive eect via the status channel, however in
9See Appendix A for a more formal discussion. The comparative statics for this model
are available upon request from the authors.
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the opposite direction of the usual argument: for agents with very low levels
of non-labour income there would be very low responsiveness to marginal
taxation but a strong eect on relative status. This increases the overall
importance to the social planner of the private consumption term (ln k),
and lowers the degree to which the status race produces negative external
eects (essentially, because those agents with very high non-labour incomes
have `won' the wealth and health status race by means of their endowment,
reducing the role of marginal taxation down to pure redistribution).
A further extension to the model is to consider the possibility of taxing
personal health investments (i.e., health-enhancing activities). Intuitively,
this nullies the main distinction between health and income, whereby in-
come is a proxy for the consumption of all other goods. The optimal taxation
arguments in the given model depend on the reasonableness of the assump-
tion that health investments are more dicult to observe and thus harder to
tax than labour income (or other more visible forms of consumption). Hence,
when health investments become just as taxable as other consumption goods,
this distinction falls away and we expect the normal arguments on status or
positional goods to apply: that is, every status-oriented activity should be
taxed by the social planner in order to promote the consumption of activities
and goods that do not involve status competitions, such as leisure (Frank
1985).10
3 Empirical Application
In this section we estimate the importance of relative concerns about personal
consumption and health in a society. The data we use come from the rst nine
waves of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA)
Survey. HILDA is a nationally representative household survey that started
in 2001. Face-to-face interviews and self-completion questionnaires have been
conducted annually with members of each household who are at least fteen
years of age. The former technique is mainly used to gather demographic
and socioeconomic information, while the latter is used to capture the health
10Another extension to the simple model above is to specify labour income (hence con-
sumption) as an increasing function of personal health k(h) where kh > 0. Hence, as
individuals become healthier they are able to work harder and also become more produc-
tive. While such an addition may capture some observable facts from the labour market,
it leads to indeterminacy in the comparative statics.
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levels and lifestyle choices of respondents (see Watson and Wooden 2002).
After excluding respondents with missing information on the key outcome
and explanatory variables, our main sample consists of 97; 225 person-year
observations corresponding to 18; 882 individuals.
3.1 Data and Specication
The outcome variable used to proxy individual utility is self-reported life
satisfaction. Life satisfaction is measured annually using responses to the
following question: \All things considered, how satised are you with your
life?" Respondents are informed to: \Pick a number between 0 and 10 to
indicate how satised you are. The more satised you are, the higher number
you should pick. The less satised you are, the lower the number." The
responses to this question follow a negatively skewed distribution, with a
mode and median equal to 8. More than 85% of the surveyed individuals
report a life satisfaction score of 7 or above.
We estimate the following life satisfaction equation:
lsit =  lnhit +  ln ehit +  ln yit +  ln eyit + zit + i + it (16)
where lsit is the life satisfaction of person i at time period t; hit denotes own
health; ehit is the peer or reference level of health; yit is own disposable income
from all sources (a proxy for private consumption); eyit is peer income; and
zit is a vector of other socioeconomic and demographic explanatory variables
such as age, gender, years of education, employment status, marital status,
family composition, and government non-income social support expenditures.
The term i captures time-invariant unobserved characteristics or individual
xed eects, and it is a random error.
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We hypothesise life satisfaction (and experienced utility) to be increasing
in own income and own health ( > 0,  > 0), and decreasing in peer income
(a status or envy eect:  < 0). The empirical slope attached to the peer
health variable is of most interest to us: where a negative coecient ( <
11We consider both cardinal and ordinal views of individual utility, and hence make
the following assumptions: (i) individuals are willing and able to answer life satisfaction
questions; (ii) reported life satisfaction, or happiness, is related to the concept of utility;
and (iii) responses are cardinally comparable, that is, the satisfaction dierence between
a 4 and a 6 is the same as the dierence between an 8 and a 10, and so on. For a review
of dierent methodologies in analysing happiness data, see Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters
(2004), and Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004).
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0) would imply individuals to experience a negative shock to own happiness
as others in their reference group become healthier (an `envy' or `expecta-
tions adjustment' eect), while a positive coecient ( > 0) would suggest
individuals to feel happier as relevant others become healthier (an `empathy'
eect).
The comparison eects in health may dier from those in the income
domain due to personal health levels having multiple dimensions or aspects
which induce separate status and empathy channels. For instance, physical
tness and slimness are likely to be considered by most people as status
signals, given the many positive social and economic outcomes that these
health attributes bring about. People would then elicit a strong tendency to
compete and overtake others in the physical tness and slimness domains;
leaving the less t and more obese individuals feeling envious. On the other
hand, some physical and mental health aspects (such as bodily pain and
anxiety) are likely to be considered more negative (less competitive) and
hence lead to feelings of empathy from individuals observing their peers in
such ill-health states.12
Moreover, a negative estimate of  could come about via two closely
related and complementary explanations. First, better peer health may well
induce social competition and feelings of envy within individuals, making
them feel less satised with their own lives. Second, by observing healthier
peers, individual agents are likely to realise that they have not yet met the
health norms and expectations of their social group (Sen 2002); making them
feel left out and less happy. Hence, the latter adjustment of expectations
could arguably be seen as the psychological step or motive which leads to
the status-oriented behaviour described above. Overall, a nding that life
satisfaction is negatively aected by peer health would suggest the envy
eect to dominate the empathy eect (and vice versa).
The variable used to dene individual health is based on answers to the
following question: \In general, would you say your health is: poor, fair, good,
very good, or excellent," with the possible responses coded as 1 (poor) to 5
(excellent). The mean response to this self-assessed health (SAH) question
is 3:4, with more than 80% of respondents choosing 3 or above.
An issue with the above SAH measure also relates to the concept of
12It could nevertheless be argued that altruism is more likely to be directed towards
closer family members, as opposed to the more distant individuals in society such as the
broad respondent or exogenous reference groups typically analysed in nationally represen-
tative household surveys. See, for example, Powdthavee (2009).
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norms and expectations, whereby respondents are inclined to rank their cur-
rent health status based on their social context and experience. That is, an
individual's perception of their own health state may be seriously limited by
the quality of his or her environment. As discussed by Sen (2002), Salomon
et al. (2004) and Lora (2012), a person living in an area surrounded by sick
people is bound to report a dierent health score relative to someone with
the same objective health but who has adapted to a much healthier com-
munity. That is, the former individual would be much more resilient to the
negative emotional eects of ill-health. Such a link between the health of
others and perceptions of own health make it dicult to declare self-assessed
health as being exogenous. At the same time, while individual xed eects
capture and eliminate some unobserved psychological traits of respondents,
there still remain other personal attributes, such as optimism levels, which
arguably change over time and in turn inuence individual life satisfaction
ratings.13
Using this same SAH measure, Powdthavee (2009) examines the impor-
tance of health norm eects within British households. He shows that the
estimated negative correlation between SAH and individuals' own health
problems declines with the average number of health problems per (other)
family member. However, the magnitude of this reference eect is relatively
small, implying SAH scores to unlikely suer from large health-norm eects.14
3.1.1 Measuring Peer Health
We derive the reference or peer health variable using the cell mean approach,
where social reference groups comprise individuals of similar demographic
and socioeconomic characteristics such as age, gender, education, and ge-
13The validity of self-assessed health measures has further been questioned by Deaton
(2008) and others. Despite the shortcomings, such SAH ratings are an increasingly com-
mon measure of personal health in empirical research (Deaton and Paxson 1998; Smith
1999; Frijters et al. 2005; Graham et al. 2011). This is supported by studies that show
SAH to be correlated with actual health (Cutler and Richardson 1997; Kaplan and Baron-
Epel 2003), as well as being a strong predictor of subsequent use of medical services (van
Doorslaer et al. 2004).
14See Clark (2003) and Eggers et al. (2006) for empirical evidence on social norm eects
in the context of unemployment. The authors nd the negative impact of unemployment
on average happiness levels to be less severe the higher the unemployment rate in the local
region (or household).
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ographical region.15 After survey respondents are grouped into `cells', the
mean value of the socioeconomic variable of interest is computed as the
reference or comparison point (see Clark and Oswald 1996; McBride 2001;
Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005; Luttmer 2005; Vendrik and Woltjer 2007; Graham
et al. 2011).
We additionally take the `time era' of responses into account, as otherwise
respondents are taken to compare themselves to others of similar attributes
from much earlier and later survey waves (that could be several years or even
decades apart). When one does not take time era into account, such as in the
study by McBride (2001), one simply groups respondents who are of similar
recorded age, but who have lived in totally dierent time periods and whom
are quite unlikely to consider each other as peers.
We thus compute the cell mean of self-assessed general health for a set
of reference groups, where each group contains individuals of similar age,
gender, education level, geographical region, and time era. We divide age
into six groups: (i) 25 or younger, (ii) between 26 and 35, (iii) between 36
and 45, (iv) between 46 and 55, (v) between 56 and 65, and (vi) older than
65. Similarly, education is categorised according to the number of years at
school: less than 10, 10, 11, 12, and more than 12. The regions correspond
to the 8 states/territories in Australia: New South Wales, Victoria, Queens-
land, South Australia, Western Australia, Tasmania, Northern Territory, and
Australian Capital Territory. Additionally, to capture the time dimension of
peer groups, we sort respondents by survey wave (9 waves in total). In or-
der to avoid peer groups of small size, we omit all cells which comprise less
than 10 individuals. This results in 746 dierent and exogenous reference
groups; with an average group size of 135 individuals, and an overall range
between 10 and 423 peers. The constructed reference groups are thus of simi-
lar size and range to those found in existing happiness studies also using large
household surveys (e.g., Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005; Vendrik and Woltjer 2007;
Blanchower et al. 2009; Graham et al. 2011). We calculate the average
self-assessed health level for each group and match the corresponding value
to each member. It should be also noted that an individual's own health
level is excluded when computing his or her cell mean.
Prior to estimating the above life satisfaction regressions, it is impor-
tant to understand that any identied relations between individual and peer
group outcomes cannot be interpreted as strictly causal. The main reason
15The peer income variable is constructed using the same cell mean approach.
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is that people residing in the same region are exposed to identical economic
and environmental constraints, such as prices for goods and services, and dis-
tance to fast-food outlets, recreation parks and tness centres, for example.
Such common unobserved contextual factors make it dicult to separately
estimate peer eects from the common circumstances and changes aecting
both individuals and their peers (Manski 1993). Another related problem is
that we are making a particular assumption as to whom the peers are (those
in the same cell), and that deviations from these exogenously dened peer
groups would invite measurement error in the peer variables.
3.2 Results
Table 1 presents the estimation results, with corresponding p-values shown
in the parentheses. For completeness, we treat life satisfaction both as a car-
dinal (columns 2 to 6) and ordinal (columns 7 to 9) measure. The coecient
on ln(Own Health) is statistically signicant and positive, conrming that
individuals feel happier as their health levels improve. At the same time,
the coecient estimate on ln(Peer Health) is highly signicant and negative,
suggesting that people are less satised with their lives as their peers become
healthier, i.e. the presence of a comparison health eect. This nding is con-
sistent across all three methodologies and empirical models. The absolute
magnitudes of the two coecients are not very similar, rejecting the hypoth-
esis that utility is totally relative in health.16 Thus, a higher level of absolute
health in society does raise the average happiness of individuals. Moreover,
own health (on average) plays a greater role in people's lives compared to
peer health, with the magnitude of the estimated coecient on the former
16The log-linear specication in (16) is equivalent to
lsit =  lnhit +  ln

hit=ehit+  ln yit +  ln (yit=eyit) + zit + i + it
  lnhit + 

lnhit   lnehit+  ln yit +  (ln yit   ln eyit) + zit + i + it
 (+ ) lnhit    lnehit + ( + ) ln yit    ln eyit + zit + i + it
As the estimated coecient on own health corresponds to b + b, and that on comparison
health to b, the nding that the coecients are statistically equal and opposite is then
consistent with a fully relative utility function. That is, the benet from an additional
unit of absolute health is eectively zero,  = 0. A similar derivation holds for the income
variable.
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being roughly about twice as large in most of the estimated models (except
for the xed eects ordered logit).
In terms of the importance of income (or broad consumption) for life sat-
isfaction, we nd a signicant and positive eect of absolute income on peo-
ple's happiness, and a signicant and negative eect of peer income. These
results are consistent with the empirical literature on reference eects (see
Van de Stadt et al. 1985; Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2005; Luttmer 2005; Vendrik
and Woltjer 2007; Knight and Gunatilaka 2011; Akay et al. 2012; Corazzini
et al. 2012). However, after accounting for individual xed eects, the peer
income variable becomes statistically signicant only at the 10% level (for
the full sample and male subgroup).
There is also some evidence of gender dierences in relative concerns
across the dierent life domains, with women being more sensitive to the
health levels of their peers than men, and males being primarily more in-
terested in competing over monetary income, or material goods, with others
from their reference group. This is especially true in the xed eects equa-
tions from Table 1 (for both the cardinal and ordinal treatments). The latter
gender-specic result is consistent with Darwinian views on natural tness
and reproduction (Frank 2011). On the other hand, nding the intensity
of comparisons in health to be higher among women (than men) supports
the recent literature on comparison BMI eects; where, for example, Clark
and Etile (2011) nd females to experience a relatively greater decrease in
well-being as they become fatter than their partner.
To directly compare the relative importance of the peer health and peer
income variables for mean life satisfaction scores (i.e., the estimates of  and
), we deviate from the theoretical log specications above and estimate the
same set of regression equations using standardized self-assessed health and
income variables (with means of 0 and standard deviations of 1). The newly
estimated coecients can be referred to as standardized or beta coecients.
In Table A1, the peer health variable attracts a much higher and statistically
signicant utility weight than peer income. This is mainly evident in the
xed eects models for all three sample groups (columns 4 to 9); where the
null hypothesis of equality between the two coecients is rejected at the 1%
level in almost all cases. Overall, there is sucient evidence that people
compete with others in the personal health domain, even more so than over
monetary income.
A potential issue that could bias our ndings is the presence of multi-
collinearity. This is due to some of the explanatory variables, namely age
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and education, being also used to construct the social comparison variables.
To test for this problem, we estimated the equations from Table 1 without
either age or education, or both. Omitting any of the two variables does not
cause major changes to the coecient magnitudes and their signicance in
any of the models (as above, own health and own income eects are positive
and signicant, and reference health and reference income eects are negative
and signicant).17 We can interpret these robustness ndings as a sign that
the health of the peer group diers suciently from a linear combination of
own variables (age, health, income, gender, time) to separately identify the
relative health eects.18
3.2.1 Reference Group Variation
Finally, to examine the importance of the `time era' constraint on the ex-
ogenously dened reference groups, we perform an additional estimation and
robustness exercise by simply removing peer groupings based on survey wave.
That is, individuals are now assumed to compare with relevant others from
all of the nine survey waves as the time dierence between waves is fully
discounted from the analysis. Such an exercise tests the plausibility of our
key methodological argument from Section 3.1.1 above: that the peer group
variable should be constructed to include the time era of social comparisons.
If this is not the case, then individuals are unrealistically taken to compare
themselves with others who have responded even many years apart. Remov-
ing this restriction leads to only 95 distinct social references groups, with an
average number of 1,063 peers within each group (and an overall range of
10 to 3; 131 individuals). One could also further argue that such large peer
17These results are available upon request from the authors.
18To test the relevance and validity of health comparisons on optimal income taxation,
we use the above parameter estimates to perform a simple calculation of the optimal tax
rate  (expressed by equation 13); with and without the eect of relative health. By
looking at the utility parameters in equation 1 and using the empirical identities derived
in footnote 16, along with the estimated coecients from the rst column of Table 1;
we have the following parameter inputs for the optimal taxation formula: a = 0:063, b
= 0:190, c = 1:571 and d = 0:726, where d corresponds to the utility weight on relative
health. We set the other parameter values in equation 13 as follows: e = 0:5, h0 = 1, ! =
0:5, and  = 1. In the absence of any status races in health (d = 0), the optimal marginal
tax rate equals  = 0:42. On the other hand, with the presence of conspicuous health (d
= 0:726); the optimal marginal tax rate on labour income is reduced to  = 0:24. The
direction of this approximated change is hence consistent with the theoretical predictions
and comparative statics derived in Section 2.1.1.
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groups fail to exist in actual societies (see Hill and Dunbar 2003).
The corresponding coecient estimates are presented in Table A2. The
general ndings support our proposed peer group denition with the eect of
the ln(Peer Income) variable becoming statistically insignicant and positive
across all of the main specications. Thus, the inclusion of a time constraint
in the denition of reference groups leads to more plausible behavioural pa-
rameters.
4 Conclusion
This paper studied a simple model of status-seeking over multiple socioeco-
nomic domains, namely conspicuous consumption and conspicuous health,
and the apparent implications for public policy. We showed that an increase
in concerns for conspicuous consumption has the well-established positive ef-
fect on the optimal income tax rate, where individuals are made to internalise
the negative externality placed on others from increased own consumption
(due to the reduced social status experienced by others). Such comparative
statics reduce the social cost of redistribution as income taxes internalise the
externalities arising from conspicuous consumption.
On the other hand, we showed that increased social competition in the
personal health domain (that is, a higher concern for relative health) has
an osetting role by leading to a decrease in optimal taxation: a greater
concern for conspicuous health leads to an overconsumption of health that
reduces the available time for other activities. In the model presented, this
health overconsumption is implicitly taxed by reducing taxation on labour
time. An equivalent interpretation is that an increase in conspicuous health
reduces the need for public goods (such as public health) and as such conveys
a positive externality on the public purse.
We then introduced an empirical denition of exogenous reference groups
that controls for the time period of respondents within the survey panel, and
tested for the presence of comparison consumption and health eects using
life satisfaction data from Australia. There is evidence that individuals envy
both the income and health level of their peers. Absolute health was found
to matter more than peer health, however the latter factor is of notable
importance for individual happiness. Moreover, women seem to care more
about relative health than men, whilst men were found to care more about
relative income (or consumption). The overall results do not rule out the
18
actual presence of an empathy channel in health comparisons (as found in
other studies), but do imply the envy channel to be more dominant for the
studied sample.
The nding that individuals engage in simultaneous status races in health
and income gives a more complex picture of optimal health policy: as con-
spicuous displays of health become a prevalent means of obtaining status in
society, the argument for taxing conspicuous consumption via income tax
reduces as well as the need for public health provision because individuals
themselves invest more in health. On the other hand, conspicuous health is
itself a source of inequality, which leads to the question of whether it can be
redistributed.
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Table 1: Life Satisfaction Equations: Hilda Survey 2001 2009
Pooled OLS Fixed Eects FE Ordered Logit
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
ln(Own Health) 1:571 1:569 1:570 0:902 0:875 0:924 1:509 1:492 1:524
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
ln(Peer Health)  0:726  1:005  0:692  0:625  0:459  0:826  1:263  0:939  1:634
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:03) (0:00) (0:00) (0:03) (0:00)
ln(Own Income) 0:063 0:062 0:061 0:028 0:025 0:030 0:051 0:046 0:054
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
ln(Peer Income)  0:190  0:136  0:242  0:082  0:120  0:054  0:180  0:264  0:121
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:08) (0:07) (0:41) (0:06) (0:07) (0:36)
Number of Observations 100; 403 47; 133 53; 270 100; 403 47; 133 53; 270 220; 137 99; 680 120; 457
R2 0:16 0:16 0:16 0:08 0:10 0:07 0:03 0:03 0:03
Number of Individuals 19; 229 9; 243 9; 986
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses. Life Satisfaction (dependent variable) is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, with a mean and standard
deviation of 7:49 and 1:49, respectively. Peer Health and Peer Income are dened as cell means given by age, gender, education, geographical region,
and time era (see Section 3.1.1). Other explanatory variables include age and age2, ln(years of education), ln(number of children), government
(non-income) support expenditures, an unemployment dummy, a couple (married) dummy, a single parent dummy, a dummy for couples with
children under the age of 15, and a dummy for couples with independent children. Constant terms are included in models. The main pooled OLS
equation also includes a male dummy. FE Ordered Logit estimates are based on the BUC estimator developed by Baetschmann et al. (2011),
where the overall t is measured using a pseudo-R2.
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Appendix A
A1. Estimation results with standardized health and income variables
Table A1: Life Satisfaction Equations: Hilda Survey 2001 2009
Pooled OLS Fixed Eects FE Ordered Logit
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
Own Health 0:523 0:519 0:525 0:288 0:275 0:298 0:546 0:532 0:556
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (20:63) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Peer Health  0:069  0:087  0:078  0:072  0:056  0:088  0:147  0:116  0:178
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (2:90) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Own Income 0:100 0:109 0:091 0:049 0:052 0:046 0:110 0:119 0:100
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (5:14) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
Peer Income  0:070  0:055  0:079 0:005 0:004 0:002 0:005 0:004  0:003
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:71) (0:20) (0:92) (0:87) (0:92) (0:95)
Number of Observations 100; 403 47; 133 53; 270 100; 403 47; 133 53; 270 220; 137 99; 680 120; 457
R2 0:16 0:16 0:16 0:03 0:04 0:03 0:03 0:03 0:04
Number of Individuals 19; 229 9; 243 9; 986
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses. Life Satisfaction (dependent variable) is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, with a mean and standard
deviation of 7:49 and 1:49, respectively. Peer Health and Peer Income are dened as cell means given by age, gender, education, geographical
region, and time era (see Section 3.1.1). These variables are also standardized with a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Other explanatory
variables include age and age2, ln(years of education), ln(number of children), government (non-income) support expenditures, an unemployment
dummy, a couple (married) dummy, a single parent dummy, a dummy for couples with children under the age of 15, and a dummy for couples with
independent children. Constant terms are included in models. The main pooled OLS equation also includes a male dummy. FE Ordered Logit
estimates are based on the BUC estimator developed by Baetschmann et al. (2011), where the overall t is measured using a pseudo-R2.
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A2. Reference group not dened by `time era'
Table A2: Life Satisfaction Equations: Hilda Survey 2001 2009
Pooled OLS Fixed Eects FE Ordered Logit
All Male Female All Male Female All Male Female
ln(Own Health) 1:574 1:570 1:572 0:901 0:874 0:923 1:507 1:491 1:520
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
ln(Peer Health)  1:280  1:781  1:355  1:014  1:331  0:721  2:095  2:800  1:500
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:04) (0:00) (0:00) (0:03)
ln(Own Income) 0:057 0:057 0:054 0:027 0:025 0:029 0:050 0:046 0:053
(0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00) (0:00)
ln(Peer Income) 0:027 0:117  0:054 0:061 0:077 0:038 0:120 0:153 0:075
(0:50) (0:07) (0:33) (0:18) (0:22) (0:55) (0:21) (0:27) (0:57)
Number of Observations 100; 963 47; 421 53; 542 100; 963 47; 421 53; 542 221; 562 100; 368 121; 194
R2 0:16 0:16 0:16 0:05 0:05 0:05 0:03 0:03 0:03
Number of Individuals 19; 267 9; 265 10; 002
Notes: Robust p-values in parentheses. Life Satisfaction (dependent variable) is measured on a scale from 0 to 10, with a mean and standard
deviation of 7:49 and 1:49, respectively. Peer Health and Peer Income are dened as cell means given by age, gender, education, and geographical
region. Other explanatory variables include age and age2, ln(years of education), ln(number of children), government (non-income) support
expenditures, an unemployment dummy, a couple (married) dummy, a single parent dummy, a dummy for couples with children under the age of
15, and a dummy for couples with independent children. Constant terms are included in models. The main pooled OLS equation also includes
a male dummy. FE Ordered Logit estimates are based on the BUC estimator developed by Baetschmann et al. (2011), where the overall t is
measured using a pseudo-R2.
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A3. Augmented model with non-labour income
Consider the addition of non-labour income to the main theoretical model
from Section 2. Intuitively, this would introduce individuals with high en-
dowments in wealth who would be expected to spend that endowment on
personal health investments and hence reduce their work hours. Under a
homogenous distribution of non-labour income, the same previously derived
comparative statics should nevertheless hold, both for individual choice be-
haviour and optimal income taxation (however, with a more complicated
formula for  ). On the other hand, assuming that k = !(1   )lw + Y ,
where Y  0 diers over individual agents (i.e., non-labour income is not
xed but presumed low enough such that every individual supplies a positive
number of labour hours), we have the utility function
u = a ln k + b ln

k=ek+ c lnh+ d ln h=eh+ e ln(1  lw   lh) +G (17)
with the following rst-order conditions
a+ b
lw +
Y
!(1 )
=
e
1  lw   lh (18)
(c+ d)
h0
 
+ lh
=
e
1  lw   lh (19)
Solving equations (18) and (19) simultaneously, we again arrive at the chosen
number of work and health production hours
lw =
(a+ b)(1 + h0
 
)  Y (e+c+d)
!(1 )
(a+ b+ c+ d+ e)
(20)
lh =
(c+ d)(1 + Y
!(1 ))  (a+ b+ e)h0 
(a+ b+ c+ d+ e)
(21)
In this case, the optimal time variables depend on the labour wage and tax
rate. Given these equations, all of the previously derived comparative statics
(in Section 2.0.1) still go through qualitatively in terms of their sign.
The social planner's objective function is the average utility (of the rep-
resentative agent). However, the problem here is that the relative income
(k=ek) and health (h=eh) terms do not disappear since the inclusion of the
distribution of non-labour income (Y ) involves an added mechanism absent
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from the original model. Agents with low levels of non-labour income will
then be aected relatively strongly in terms of their social status by taxes
on labour time; leading to a direct benet of increased overall status from
lower taxation. The latter eect increases with b and hence goes against the
previous comparative statics on the optimal marginal tax rate. The strength
of this eect will depend on the distribution of non-labour income, however
the more unequal the distribution of Y is; the more important the above
consideration becomes.
Overall, the status race in the consumption domain does not fall out from
the social planner's equation in the augmented model, and a heterogeneous
distribution of non-labour income introduces a whole layer of additional com-
plexity to the optimal taxation problem. Similarly, the inclusion of Y in total
wealth means that changes in taxation now do impact the optimal labour and
health related time variables, with higher income taxation reducing labour
supply and increasing health production. It is thus not as clear whether
the same comparative statics from the simpler model also hold true in the
extended model.
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